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Carbon Taxes and Stranded Assets: Evidence from Washington State 






The climate challenge requires ambitious climate policy. A sudden increase 
in carbon prices can lead to major shocks to the stock market. Some assets 
will lose part of their value, others all of it, and hence become “stranded”. 
If the markets are not ready to absorb the shock, a financial crisis could 
follow. How well investors anticipate, and thus how large these shocks may 
be, is an empirical question. We analyze stock market reactions to the 
rejection of two carbon tax initiatives by voters in Washington state. We 
build proper counterfactuals for Washington state firms and find that these 
modest policy proposals with limited jurisdiction caused substantial 
readjustments on the stock market, especially for carbon-intensive stocks. 
Our results reinforce concerns about “stranded assets” and the risk of 
financial contagion. Our policy implications support the inclusion of 
transition risks in macroprudential policymaking and carbon disclosure and 
climate stress tests as the main policy responses. 
 
Keywords: Carbon pricing; financial returns; systemic risk; 
macroprudential policies; voting 
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 The climate challenge requires the immediate implementation of ambitious climate 
policies. However, global and national financial institutions have expressed concerns that 
an abrupt and coordinated increase in carbon prices could lead to major shocks to the 
stock market, with the potential for systemic risk. Some assets will lose part of their 
value, others all of it, and hence become “stranded”. If the markets are not ready to 
absorb the shock, a financial crisis could follow. The number of jurisdictions pricing 
carbon has increased substantially over the last few years, mainly following the Paris 
Agreement, to reach 57 jurisdictions and a coverage of about 20 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions (World Bank 2019). Very recently, the World Bank’s High- 
level Commission on Carbon Prices called for a global carbon price in the order of $40 to 
$80 per ton of CO2 (Stiglitz et al. 2017). While the increase in coverage and stringency of 
carbon pricing should be good news for climate change mitigation, in a recent and very 
influential speech the Bank of England’s governor Mark Carney expressed strong 
concerns for the potential role that stranded assets could play in destabilizing the global 
economy (Carney 2015). 
A global financial crisis caused by climate policy would not only disrupt the lives of 
millions of people, but also represent a major setback for climate action. Macroprudential 
measures, such as climate stress tests, have become part of the policy options considered 
by institutes such as the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB 2016), and are under 
consideration in Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom (Caldecott et al. 2016; Campiglio et al. 2017, 2018). In the United Kingdom, 
the Streamlined Energy and Carbon Reporting regulations seek to mandate carbon 
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disclosure for all quoted as well as large unquoted companies. In the United States, 
Senator Elizabeth Warren sponsored the Climate Risk Disclosure Act, a bill requiring 
public companies to disclose critical information about their exposure to climate-related 
risks. 
 How well investors anticipate, and thus how large these shocks may be, is an 
empirical question. In this paper, we analyze stock market reactions to the largely 
unexpected defeat of two carbon tax initiatives in Washington state, Initiatives 732 (I-
732) and 1631 (I-1631). We leverage an important difference in the design of these 
carbon taxes, namely that one implied a revenue-neutral reform (I-732) while the other 
could have been classified as an environmental spending bill (I-1631), along the lines of 
the currently debated Green New Deal. 
 Our main findings are as follows: (i) both events led to significant readjustments in 
the value of Washington-based firms, (ii) these adjustments are stronger for carbon- 
intensive stocks, and (iii) all adjustments tend to be stronger for I-1631 than for the 
revenue-neutral I-732. These results have crucial implications for designing cost- 
effective policies in the face of climate change. In particular, the important swings in the 
stock market price of Washington-based firms observed in our context suggest that even a 
relatively modest policy with limited jurisdiction can represent an important shock to the 
stock market. Hence, the concern about systemic risk in the case of a coordinated 
implementation of ambitious carbon prices across countries seems justified. While our 
analyses do not offer a direct test of the usefulness of macroprudential measures such as 
mandated carbon disclosure and climate stress tests, they do support the rationale for such 
interventions. 
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 Our empirical strategy takes advantage of the uniqueness of Washington state’s 
framework and leverage the important differences that exist between these two initiatives. 
I-732, championed by stand-up economist Yoram Bauman and his grassroot organization 
Carbon Washington, was designed as a revenue-neutral, business-friendly carbon tax 
(Anderson et al. 2019). Following the example of the British Columbia carbon tax, 
implemented in 2008, I-732 had a pre-announced tax escalator and redistributed the 
money back to the economy. While British Columbia did so mainly through income tax 
rebates, the absence of an income tax in Washington state led the policy entrepreneurs 
behind I-732 to opt for a reduction in the sales tax. I-732 was announced in March 2015 
and the ballot took place on November 8, 2016. While I-732 was supported by some 
business lobbies, environmentalists were strongly divided. Very powerful actors in the 
environmental justice community, such as the Sierra Club, opposed the initiative. Their 
opposition was not directed at carbon taxes per se, but rather at the specific, revenue-
neutral design of I-732. Following the rejection of I-732 by Washington state’s voters, 
environmental justice groups announced I-1631, a new carbon tax initiative, in March 
2018. I-1631 also included a tax escalator. It was, however, no longer designed to be 
revenue neutral. Expected revenues of about US$1 billion would have been distributed 
among a clean air and clean energy fund (about $700 million), a clean water and healthy 
forest fund (about $250 million), as well as support towards low-income households, 
communities, and affected workers. Hence, the main difference between the two 
proposals lies on the different use of revenues. I-1631 was rejected on November 6, 2018. 
 We access Thomson Reuters database and collect financial data on all Russell 3000 
companies, which we combine with firm-level characteristics from Compustat and other 
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data sources from Thomson Reuters. We conduct a short-run event study analysis to 
estimate the abnormal returns on the event dates. Specifically, we estimate the causal 
effect of new information about carbon taxes on the returns of Washington- based firms. 
To this end, we estimate proper control portfolios for Washington-based firms, by 
matching on observable firm characteristics. Our treated sample consists of downstream 
firms, which use energy as an input to their production function. Our approach addresses 
potential confounders in both average and heterogeneous effects. We confirm our model’s 
performance by conducting extensive placebo tests at non-event dates and with false 
treatment groups, among others. 
 Our unique approach contributes to the nascent literature on climate policy and 
systemic risk in several ways. First, we focus on new information released about the most 
prominent climate policy tool, carbon taxation. Second, we focus on the effect of new 
information on downstream firms. This approach is crucial to understand the true 
potential for systemic risk. Indeed, an important climate policy shock would not only 
affect fossil fuel companies, but the economy as a whole. Including downstream firms 
can lead to a tenfold increase in the exposure of financial intermediaries to a potential 
climate policy shock (Battiston et al. 2017). Third, we leverage differences in the design 
of the same policy tool, a carbon tax, to identify financial implications stemming from the 
considerably different economic impacts that actual policymaking can bring about. 
Fourth, we make use of our policy’s clear tax base, carbon emissions, to analyze 
heterogeneous effects along this dimension. Heterogeneity, and in particular how affected 
are the most affected firms, is crucial for assessing systemic risk. Further, heterogeneous 
effects allow us to assess whether investors take advantage of available information about 
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carbon intensity and exposure to potential carbon taxes.1  
 Our paper complements a subset of other studies, which analyze either stock market 
reactions to policy announcements with a focus on upstream energy suppliers, or release 
of scientific information with potential policy relevance. For instance, Griffin et al. 
(2015) study the impact on the stock market of two concurrent publications in Nature, 
calculating the implications for coal, gas, and oil reserves of keeping global temperatures 
within 2°C above pre-industrial levels (Allen et al. 2009 and Meinshausen et al. 2009). 
Byrd and Cooperman (2018) analyze the effect of new information about technological 
improvements in the capture and storage of carbon on the value of coal companies. Linn 
(2010) and Sen and Schickfus (2017) focus on energy utilities, and how their market 
value is affected by plans to implement an emissions trading scheme in the United States 
or a carbon tax in Germany, respectively. Hence, the existing evidence is either for energy 
suppliers or based on indirect inference from non-policy events. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the literature and 
economic background in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data and empirical approach. 
Section 4 provides our empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
Background 
 
Climate policy and stranded assets 
 About 20 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are currently covered by a 
carbon price or soon will be. Among the countries currently pricing carbon, most of them 
                                                        
1 In this way, we also contribute to this growing strand of literature. See, for instance, Beatty and Shimshack (2010), 
Kim and Lyon (2011), Oberndorfer et al. (2013), Flammer (2015), Krüger (2015), and Ramelli et al. (2018). Amel-
Zadeh (2018) provides an extensive survey. 
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have tax rates, or permit prices, around or below $10 per ton of CO2 (World Bank 2019). 
Tax rates, however, tend to increase over time, in some cases by construction, as many 
carbon tax schemes have tax escalators embedded in the policy design. Emissions trading 
schemes operate over phases, allowing the regulator to adjust the cap downward. Recent 
features such as the Market Stability Reserve in the European Union Emissions Trading 
System give regulators more power to ensure dynamic incentives (Hepburn et al. 2016). 
Hence, carbon prices are expected to keep rising over time and to cover an increasing 
portion of global emissions. Against this background, calls for a global carbon price in 
the order of $40 to $80 dollars per ton of CO2 appear increasingly plausible (Stiglitz et 
al. 2017). 
 Concerns about stranded assets started to receive considerable attention following an 
influential speech by the Bank of England’s governor Mark Carney (Carney 2015). In 
this 2015 speech, Carney highlighted three sources of risk for financial systems related 
with climate change. First, physical risks, related to the impact on financial assets of 
climate change, in particular through the intensification of natural disasters and extreme 
events (see Dietz et al. 2016). Second, liability risks, which would emerge if victims of 
climate change could seek compensation. Third, transition risks, which are the focus of 
our paper. According to Carney, changes in climate policy, and increases in stringency, 
could lead investors to reevaluate the value of a broad range of assets, potentially 
destabilizing the financial system. The term “stranded assets” has been used also more 
broadly, to define all capital investment that may lose value during the transition to a 
cleaner economy (see Asheim 2013). 
Carney’s speech, among other factors, led to both an emerging literature on stranded 
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assets and the design of additional macroprudential policies by central bankers and 
financial stability boards. Since 2016, for instance, the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), an agency of the European Central Bank, considers late and abrupt 
implementation of climate policy (defined as “hard landing”) as part of the systemic risks 
to the global financial system (ESRB 2016). The main concern is represented by the 
massive reserves of fossil fuels that would need to remain in the ground to avoid 
dangerous interferences with the climate system, but which are currently in the fossil fuel 
companies’ books.2 If the market value of these companies is readjusted belatedly and 
suddenly, potentially dangerous feedback loops could emerge. That is, the initial shock 
that climate policy would create by forcing the obsolescence of large fossil fuel assets 
could trigger systemically-relevant second-round effects. Following its analysis, ESRB’s 
policy recommendations included the mandatory disclosure of carbon intensity by some 
firms as well as the inclusion of climate-related prudential risks in stress tests (leading to 
“climate stress tests”) and other macroprudential strategies. Several other central banks 
and institutes in charge of financial stability are currently considering similar 
macroprudential policies, including in Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom (Caldecott et al. 2016; Campiglio et al. 2017, 2018). 
 Although not yet mandatory, carbon disclosure has become increasingly common in 
recent years among publicly-owned firms (Doda et al. 2016). To address investors’ 
concerns, as many as 600 companies have gone one step further and implemented an 
internal carbon pricing scheme. Internal carbon prices tend to be relatively low but could 
                                                        
2 McGlade and Ekins (2015) estimate that about 80 percent of the current coal reserves should remain unused in order to 
keep global temperatures within 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The same applies to 49 percent (33 percent) of global gas 
(oil) reserves. McGlade and Ekins (2015) update the earlier analyses by Allen et al. (2009) and Meinshausen et al. 
(2009). 
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be easily ramped up, once the scheme is in place. Shadow carbon prices tend to be much 
larger, sometimes in the order of $100 per ton of CO2 (CDP 2017; Gillingham et al. 
2017). In terms of climate stress tests, Battiston et al. (2017) provide simulations for the 
European financial system. The authors use a network approach to account for 
interlinkages among financial institutions and examine the potential magnitude of 
second-round effects. They confirm the initial concerns that an abrupt implementation of 
climate policy could lead to a systemic risk, due to the important presence of carbon-
intensive sectors in investors’ portfolios. “High-carbon exposure” stocks (i.e. stocks of 
fossil fuel companies) represent about 5 percent of pension funds’ assets, 4 percent of 
insurances’, and 1 percent of banks’ (Weyzig et al. 2014). Adding other sectors relevant 
for climate policy, as done in Battiston et al. (2017), can lead to much higher exposure, in 
the 36-48 percent range. Furthermore, financial actors own the equity of other financial 
actors in the order of 10-20 percent, implying substantial indirect exposure as well. 
 From a theoretical perspective, stranded assets could change the ranking of climate 
policy instruments. According to standard economic theory, carbon pricing dominates the 
ranking as the “first-best” instrument (Goulder and Parry 2008; Aldy and Stavins 2012). 
However, political economy issues have limited its adoption (Oates and Portney 2003; 
Carattini et al. 2018). A recent paper by Rozenberg et al. (2018) takes an Olsonian 
perspective and compares, with a simple theoretical model, different climate policy 
instruments in terms of stranded assets, which are considered visible losses of wealth 
concentrated in a few vested interests. Consistently with eco- nomic intuition, carbon 
pricing minimizes the (discounted) cost of climate policy. However, in the model, carbon 
pricing leads to stranded assets. This is not the case for “second-best” mandates, feebates, 
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and standards, which in the model only affect new capital (e.g. new coal power plants, 
new buildings). Hence, the authors identify a trade-off between cost-effectiveness and the 
generation of stranded assets.3 At the same time, however, the fact that carbon pricing 
leads to stranded assets can make climate policy more progressive (Rausch et al. 2010). 
We complement the existing literature with a novel angle, looking at the most 
prominent climate policy, the carbon tax, under different declinations, and how it impacts 
firms with varying degrees of carbon exposure. By focusing on downstream firms, and 
assessing heterogeneity along the carbon intensity dimension, we aim at capturing the full 
extent of systemic risk. As shown in the literature, the exposure of financial firms 
increases dramatically when sectors other than fossil fuel companies are taken into 
account. Whether and to what extent substantial market fluctuations affect downstream 
firms is crucial to understand the potential for systemic risk. 
Washington Initiatives 732 and 1631 
 Carbon taxes have become increasingly common in recent years, especially 
following the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Opposition from energy-intensive 
groups and from citizens remain, however, major obstacles. The first examples of carbon 
taxes date back to the early ’90s, when they were implemented in several Nordic 
countries. These schemes are known for their generous exemptions to energy-intensive 
industries. Switzerland implemented a carbon tax in 2008, but one covering only heating 
fuels (Conway et al. 2017; Narassimhan et al. 2017). More ambitious designs were 
rejected on the ballot first in 2000 and then again in 2015. Also in 2008, British Columbia 
                                                        
3 Following Goulder and Schein (2013), a carbon tax with carefully designed exemptions may limit the extent of 
stranded assets, similarly to emissions trading schemes with some grandfathering (Goulder et al. 2010). Trade-offs, 
however, remain. 
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implemented a revenue-neutral carbon tax (Murray and Rivers 2015). More than 20 
distinct carbon tax schemes currently exist around the world, to which one can add 
similar schemes such as the carbon floor and the climate change levy in the United 
Kingdom (World Bank 2019). None of these schemes was implemented following a 
public vote. 
 I-732 was designed as follows.4 The tax would have started, in 2016, with a tax rate 
of $15 per ton of CO2, which would have increased in 2018 to $25 per ton of CO2. The 
tax rate would have kept increasing gradually by 3.5 percent per year (plus inflation), 
until reaching the target of $100 per ton of CO2 (in constant 2016 dollars). Fossil fuels 
from all sources would have been taxed upstream, including imports from other states 
used for electricity generation for the Washington market. I-732 was designed as a 
revenue-neutral reform, with the objective to appeal to an electorate of moderate 
Republican voters. Revenue neutrality would have been achieved, in theory, as follows. 
The state’s sales tax would have been reduced from 6.5 percent to 5.5 percent. By 
reducing a regressive tax such as the sales tax, Carbon Washington planned to address, if 
partially, concerns related with the distributional effects of carbon taxes. To address the 
same concerns, some of the revenues would have been used to match the Federal Earning 
Income Tax Credit at 25 percent. Finally, local businesses would have benefitted from the 
elimination of the state’s business and occupation tax for manufacturers (as high as 0.48 
percent). In Washington state, the minimum number of valid signatures for an initiative to 
be successful is slightly above 250,000. The state legislature declined the opportunity to 
pass I-732 directly, or to suggest an alternative to voters, so that the initiative ended up on 
                                                        
4 Please refer to Anderson et al. (2019), on which we largely rely as well, for a thorough analysis of I-732 (and I-1631). 
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the 2016 ballot. I-732 was on the ballot on November 8, 2016 and rejected at 59 percent. 
 Following the rejection of I-732, I-1631 was announced in March 2018. Its design 
was as follows. The initial tax rate was set at $15 per ton of CO2, same as I-732, with 
implementation in 2020. The tax escalator implied an increase by $2 per ton of CO2 per 
year, until reaching statewide emissions goals. The carbon tax was not designed to be 
revenue neutral. Rather, revenues would have been earmarked to promote several goals, 
through three funds. First, a fund for clean air and clean energy. Second, a fund 
promoting water quality and forest health. Third, a fund for community-related 
investments. The policy was labeled “fee”, in line with Washington state’s laws. I-1631 
was on the ballot on November 6, 2018. The initiative was rejected at 57 percent. 
 I-723 and I-1631 have similar designs, in that they start with a relatively low tax 
rate, includes a tax escalator, and cover most CO2 in the economy, upstream. As stressed, 
the most notable difference relates to the use of revenues. I-732 was designed as revenue 
neutral, I-1631 as a Green New Deal type of policy. The difference in design also 
mattered for part of the electorate, although how voters might have split was relatively 
hard to predict beforehand (see section 3.4). Supporters of I- 732 included proponents of 
carbon taxation such as the Citizens’ Climate Lobby, Audubon Washington, and minor 
environmental groups. Local Democratic party chapters and the renewable industry also 
supported it. Local chambers of commerce and carbon-intensive industries opposed it, 
but so did also progressive organizations such as labor and social justice groups, the most 
influential environmental groups (an alliance including the Sierra Club), and the State 
Democratic party. The split among environmentalists ultimately contributed to its 
rejection. Supporters of I-1631 included many environmental groups and was 
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championed by those that opposed I-732. Opponents included business associations and 
carbon-intensive industries. For I-732, the yes-camp spent about $3 million, against $1.4 
million spent by the no-camp. For I-1631, the yes-camp spent about $15 million, with $1 
million each contributed by billionaires Bloomberg and Gates. The no-camp spent $32 
million. Overall, the campaign spending for I-1631 was a record in the state’s history, 
according to local media. 
Data and empirical strategy 
 
 In this section, we describe our data and empirical strategy. We start by detailing the 
measure capturing the effects of an event on the stock market, namely cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs). Second, we explain our estimation strategy and how we 
identify such event effects by controlling for confounding countrywide effects. Third, we 
describe our control set along with the underlying data sources and provide descriptive 
statistics. Finally, we discuss the events to be analyzed in relation to our identification 
strategy. 
Cumulative abnormal returns 
 We use a standard short-run event study methodology to estimate the abnormal 
returns associated with a given event. We estimate the normal market performance 
by using three standard approaches, which are compared for sensitivity purposes (see 
Campbell et al. 1997). These are the market model, the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), and the Fama-French three-factors model (FFM). 
 The market model is given by rit = βirmt + Eit, where rit is the return of asset 
i at the trading date t, rmt represents returns to a market price index m, and Eit is an error 
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term. The normal return is the predicted return given by rˆit = βˆirmt. We denote the 
event date with T, and specify the event window as a time period around the event date 
from T0 < T to T1 > T. To control for potential feedback from the event to the normal 
market performance, we use an estimation window prior to the event window ending at 
T0 − 1. 
 We define the relative time index τ = t − T to measure the distance to the event date. 
Then, the abnormal returns are estimated by the difference between realized returns and 
normal returns, given by the prediction errors ART +τ = rT +τ −rˆT +τ. The effect of the 
event is generally parametrized by cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which are given 
by the sum of abnormal returns (ARs) over a number of consecutive days in the event 
window. 
 In the CAPM estimations, the returns are calculated in excess of a risk-free rate of 
return. Formally, the CAPM is given by r˜it = βir˜mt + Eit, where r˜it = rit − rft, r˜mt = 
rmt −rft, and rft is a risk-free rate of return. The Fama-French model augments the 
CAPM with size (st) and value risk factors (vt) as additional covariates, such that r˜it = 
βir˜mt + λsist + λvivt + Eit. 
 Our sample consists of all firms in the 2018 Russell 3000 constituent list. We obtain 
their daily stock prices and the Russell 3000 price index from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream and calculate continuously compounded returns. As per standard procedure, 
we use one-month Treasury-bill rates as a proxy for the risk-free rate of return.5 
 
 
                                                        
5 The data on the risk-free asset and the Fama and French (1993) factors are retrieved from 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html (last accessed, May 12, 2019). 
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Figure 1: Abnormal returns around the ballot dates 
 
Note: This figure illustrates the median, and upper and lower 25th percentiles of CAPM-
adjusted ARs. ARs are truncated at upper and lower fifth percentiles. The horizontal axis 
indicates the relative distance to the events in terms of trading dates, such that date zero 
stands for the event date. 
 In our baseline setting, we estimate the normal market performance by using a 
window length of 60 trading days ending at 10 days before the event date. Hence, our 
estimation window covers a sample between dates τ = −71 and τ = −11.6 
 Figure 1 illustrates the median, and upper and lower 25th percentiles of ARs 
from the CAPM estimations for all companies in the Russell 3000 constituency list, 
regardless of their location, around the dates when I-732 and I-1631 were on the ballot in 
Washington state. We exclude upper and lower fifth percentiles. In the figures, the 
horizontal axis indicates the relative distance to the event in terms of trading dates, such 
that date zero stands for the event date. The distribution of ARs in the pre-event windows 
                                                        
6 Our results are robust to alternative estimation windows, including 90 or 150 trading days or leaving a 20-day gap 
between the estimation window and the event date. All additional estimations are available by the authors upon request. 
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are similar for both events and quite stable. The increase in the spread of ARs following 
the 2016 ballots is quite intuitive given the surprise election of Donald Trump on this date 
(see Wagner et al. 2018). On the other hand, the 2018 midterm elections do not seem to 
have had a major effect, on average. This result is in line with the common view that 
midterm election results tend to be less surprising. Incumbent presidents generally tend to 
lose seats in the first midterm, which also occurred in the 2018 election. In the next 
subsection, we explain how we control for nationwide confounding events to establish 
causality. 
Estimation strategy 
 We are interested in identifying the effect of a series of events that are expected to 
affect firms active in Washington state. A potential threat to identification is the presence 
of nationwide contemporaneous shocks, which could act as confounders. In this section, 
we describe our estimation strategy, which explicitly accounts for such potential 
confounders by using a counterfactual comparison group represented by non-
Washington-based firms. 
 Our empirical approach is as follows. Let the dummy variable Di = {0, 1} stands 
for the treatment status. In our application, it takes value one for Washington-based firms 
and zero otherwise, which represents a conservative approach. Using the potential 
outcome framework, let CAR1i denote the CAR of firm i on a single event date if it were 
a Washington-based firm, and by CAR0i if it were a non-Washington- based firm. We are 
interested in estimating the causal effect of the treatment on CARs given by 
ρ = E[CAR1i|Di = 1, Xi] − E[CAR0i|Di = 1, Xi], 
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which is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). Here, Xi is a vector of 
covariates, which we describe in the following subsection. The fundamental identification 
problem is that the second term is unobserved, as the CAR of a Washington-based firm 
(Di = 1) in the case it was based elsewhere is never observed (CAR0i). Consider the 
following specification to estimate the effect of a single event on the CARs: 
CARi = α + ρDi + Xitγ + ηi, 
 
where α is a constant, ηi is the error term, and γ is a vector of parameters. If the error term 
and Di are uncorrelated conditional on the covariate set, then ρ captures the ATET, that is, 
the causal effect of being subject to the treatment on the outcome variable CAR. The 
uncorrelatedness assumption can be stated as E[CAR0i|Di = 1, Xi] = E[CAR0i|Di = 0, Xi], 
which means that, conditional on Xi, the potential CAR when firm i were not in 
Washington (CAR0i) is independent of whether it is actually based in Washington state or 
not. Then, the observed difference between a control and a treatment unit, conditional on 
their observed characteristics X, reflects the event effect. 
 Our outcome variable is the estimated CARs. In the absence of any event on this 
date, the CARs should be equal to zero for both the control and treatment groups, as 
given by market efficiency. Further, in the absence of nationwide shocks, we could 
simply analyze the CARs of Washington-based firms. In presence of potential nationwide 
shocks, we can account for their effect by comparing treatment and control groups. 
Hence, the identification strategy relies on the ability of the covariate set to capture the 
effects of potential nationwide shocks. 
 An empirical strategy consistent with this conceptual approach is a matching 
estimation. A matching estimand constructs a counterfactual unit that best mimics the 
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observed characteristics of a treated unit, such that a control unit is assigned a larger 
weight if it is closer to the treatment unit in terms of its observed characteristics. The 
advantage of a matching strategy is that it maximizes balance across compared units in 
terms of their observed characteristics, such as size and leverage. We estimate the weights 
by using the propensity score matching (PSM) algorithm. The propensity score represents 
the probability of receiving the treatment as predicted by observable characteristics (X). 
We estimate these scores by using a logit regression of treatment status on various 
covariate sets. We present our test results on the balance of covariates and overlap 
assumption in the Appendix together with the results from additional, standard estimators 
for treatment effects. 
Covariate set 
 Our control set includes a rich set of characteristics describing companies in the 
Russell 3000 index, based on the 2018 list of constituents. All firm characteristics are 
obtained from Thomson Reuters. For all variables, we use the latest available accounting 
data prior to an event date. Table 1 presents a set of descriptive statistics with 2017 values 
for the variables in our baseline control set. We employ standard firm characteristics such 
as profitability, leverage ratio, market capitalization, and sales growth. We augment this 
set with additional variables that can further account for potential confounding events. I-
732 was on the ballot on November 8, 2016, which was marked with Donald Trump’s 
surprise election. It is reasonable to expect this surprise election to have nationwide 
effects on the stock market. For instance, Wagner et al. (2018) find that the victory of the 
Republican candidate in the 2016 election increased the stock value of firms with a 
stronger global orientation and a higher tax burden. In a conservative approach, we 
augment the standard control set by adding variables such as corporate income tax rate 
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and foreign sales ratio.7 
Table 1: Control set: descriptive statistics for 2017 
 N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Leverage ratio (%) 2741 26.51 24.05 20.86 0.02 106.69 
Profitability (%) 2883 0.17 2.37 16.70 -94.49 34.73 
Annual net sales growth (%) 2819 11.34 7.68 25.55 -120.79 195.08 
Market cap ($ bil.) 2894 10.57 1.79 41.97 0.01 867.51 
Tax rate (5-year average) (%) 2575 23.46 26.51 12.84 0.00 65.93 
Foreign sales ratio (%) 2949 18.67 0.00 26.68 0.00 100.00 
Emissions (tons of CO2-e) 
 
Carbon intensity: 
2341 1238.30 37.66 8843.15 0.08 294950.38 
Emissions to net sales (tons of CO2-e/$) 2328 233.39 25.63 2064.55 0.01 93754.09 
Emissions to physical assets (tons CO2-e/$) 2280 873.55 133.46 16859.83 0.17 782361.75 
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for our main control variables. Leverage is 
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of pre-tax corporate income 
to total assets. Tax rate is the 5-year averaged ratio of corporate income tax to pre-tax 
income. Foreign sales ratio is the percentage of foreign sales over total sales. In the 
calculation of carbon intensity, physical assets consist of the value of plants, properties, 
and equipment. 
 Given that the tax burden of a carbon tax is proportional to a company’s emissions, 
measured as CO2 equivalent (or CO2-e), we expect both I-732 and I-1631 to have 
heterogeneous effects depending on how carbon intensive a firm is. In particular, we 
consider the following two ratios as measures of carbon intensity: emissions to net sales 
and emissions to physical assets. Firm-level CO2 emissions are retrieved from the 
Thomson Reuters ESG Carbon database, which relies on self-reported emissions and 
imputes missing data based on past emissions, firm size, energy consumption, and 
industry characteristics. Another dataset measuring CO2 emissions, which is commonly 
employed in the literature, comes from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) database. In 
our sample of firms, the correlation between our measure of emissions and scope 1 
emissions reported in the CDP database is virtually perfect for 2015. 
                                                        
7 Our results are robust to using cash-effective tax rates rather than corporate income tax rates. 
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Measurement of events and further considerations for identification 
 The main focus of our empirical analyses is the outcome of the vote on I-732, on 
November 8, 2016, and I-1631, on November 6, 2018. While both initiatives were 
eventually rejected, prior to the ballot day they were both heading in the opinion polls. 
Hence, the markets can be expected to have readjusted following the release of the actual 
outcome. Table 2 presents a summary of the opinion polls, which were realized by 
different organizations in the approach to the ballots. For I-732, the most recent opinion 
poll indicated 42 percent yes-votes against 37 percent no-votes. According to the online 
political encyclopedia Ballotpedia.org, in the final two weeks prior to the ballots, more 
than $1 million was spent by the opposition camp, most likely trying to counteract the 
consistent support observed in the opinion polls. For I-1631, the level of support in the 
polls was even high enough to exceed the 50 percent cutoff. In this case, recall that the 
opposition spent about $32 million. 
Table 2: Poll Results 
Poll Initiative Date Yes (%) No (%) Undecided (%) Sample 
Elway I-732 Aug. 2016 34 37 30 500 
KOMO News/Strategies 360 I-732 Sep.-Oct. 2016 42 37 21 500 
Elway I-732 Oct. 2016 40 32 28 502 
YouGov I-732 Oct. 2016 51 44 5 750 
Crosscut/Elway I-1631 Oct. 2018 50 36 14 400 
Note: The source for all polls is Ballotpedia.org. Margin of error across the polls varies 
between +/- 4.4 and +/- 5.0. 
 Further, we consider natural that investors were made aware of the initiatives’ 
outcomes on the ballot day or a few days after. While two emissions trading schemes are 
operational in California and in the Northeast, no carbon tax exists to date in the United 
States. If any of these initiatives had passed, it would have been the first carbon tax to be 
ever implemented statewide. Hence, there was considerable public interest around these 
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initiatives. While considerable public interest is not a necessary element for investors to 
be informed about political events, it makes it even more plausible that the ballot 
outcomes rapidly became public knowledge. Illustrating this point, Figure 2 presents the 
search popularity of three related terms on Google: “carbon tax”, “Initiative 732,” and 
“Initiative 1631.” As standard with Google search data, as provided by Google Trends, 
the maximum score during a given period is normalized at 100. Both the search term 
“Initiative 732” and the term “Initiative 1631” attain the maximum popularity score 
around the respective ballots. The search terms “Initiative 732” and “Initiative 1631” can 
partially reflect local interest. On the other hand, the popularity of the term “carbon tax” 
is more likely to be driven by countrywide interest. The term “carbon tax” attains its 
maximum popularity in February 2016 when the Supreme Court blocked the enforcement 
of the Clean Power Plan (CPP). This decision had a global importance, as the CCP was 
the Obama administration’s major policy to curb CO2 emissions. Relative to this score, 
the search popularity of the three terms around the relevant ballot dates is substantial. 
Figure 2: Google Trends outcomes for “carbon tax”, “Initiative 732”, and “Initiative 
1631”, between 2015 and 2019 
 
Note: This figure presents the weekly search popularity on Google of the following three 
terms: "carbon tax", "Initiative 732," "Initiative 1631." All series come from Google 
Trends. All the illustrated scores are relative to the maximum, set by Google at 100. 
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 Both in 2016 and 2018, there were other state initiatives on the ballot together with 
I-732 and I-1631. We discuss these initiatives in detail in Appendix A. In short, we are 
not concerned about these other initiatives acting as confounders for the following three 
reasons. First, some of them are largely irrelevant for the stock market, as only a small 
fraction of the economy is affected by either approval or rejection. Second, by the ballot 
date, the outcome of most of them was clearly predictable, with polls suggesting a clear 
outcome and the ballot results matching the polls’ forecast very well. Third, none of the 
initiatives on the ballot relate directly to the carbon intensity of firms in the way that 
initiatives I-732 and I-1631 do. If the ATETs that we find in the main analyses were 
driven only by these confounders, then we should not find any heterogeneity along the 
carbon-intensity dimension. 
 In the next section, we show empirically that the rejection of the carbon tax 
initiatives led to positive and significant reactions in the stock market. This result implies 
that the stock markets had already (partially) priced in the effects of a potential approval. 
In order to validate this intuition, we further analyze the stock market reactions to the 
dates on which the initiatives were submitted and approved officially. 
Results 
 
 In this section, we present our main results. We start by presenting average effects of 
the initiatives’ ballot rejections on Washington-based firms. Next, we present our analysis 
on heterogeneity in the ATETs. Finally, we present a set of complementary findings 
leveraging the announcement dates for both initiatives. 
Average effects of the ballot results on the valuation of Washington-based firms 
 This section presents our main results concerning the average effects of ballot results 
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for I-732 and I-1631 on the stock performance of Washington-based firms. Table 3 
presents the results from our OLS and PSM estimations. The dependent variables are 
either the CAPM or Fama-French Model (FFM) adjusted 10-day CARs calculated from a 
window starting with the next date following the event. Using CARs based on the market 
model and using CAPM-adjusted CARs yields similar results. We present the 
corresponding results from using CARs based on the market model in Appendix B. 
 Table 3 shows that the estimated effect of I-1631’s rejection is positive and 
significant. This result is robust to employing different control sets, using CAPM- or 
FFM-adjusted CARs, and using OLS or PSM. For I-732, using OLS or PSM and using 
different control sets do not lead to drastic differences in the estimated effects. However, 
the estimations based on FFM-adjusted CARs yield systematically higher estimates 
compared to those based on CAPM-adjusted CARs. Hence, it seems that controlling for 
Fama-French risk factors is important to account for the role of confounders and the 
important noise surrounding the rejection of I-732. Given the predictive power of Fama-
French risk factors and the insensitivity of our estimates to OLS or PSM, we present the 
results from OLS estimations with FFM-adjusted CARs in the rest of the main text. We 
provide the corresponding results from using CAPM- adjusted CARs, as well as PSM for 
all models, in Appendices B and C, respectively. In the rest of the paper, we use the full 





Table 3: Average event effects on Washington-based firms 
  Initiative 732  Initiative 1631 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
CAPM - OLS 0.076 0.731 0.175  2.013∗∗ 2.326∗∗ 2.072∗ 
 (0.974) (0.995) (0.910)  (0.812) (1.112) (1.061) 
Treatment 41 32 32  42 29 29 
Observations 2511 1959 1959  2658 2134 2134 
CAPM - PSM 0.067 1.455 -0.278  2.011∗∗ 1.807 1.984∗∗ 
 (0.876) (1.168) (1.045)  (0.803) (1.156) (0.794) 
Treatment 41 32 32  42 29 29 
Observations 2384 1959 1667  2526 2133 2027 
FF - OLS 1.950∗∗ 2.800∗∗∗ 2.133∗
∗ 
 2.171∗∗∗ 2.285∗∗ 2.082∗∗ 
 (0.980) (0.975) (0.965)  (0.789) (1.102) (1.053) 
Treatment 44 31 31  42 29 29 
Observations 2517 1962 1962  2659 2136 2136 
FF - PSM 1.945∗∗ 3.294∗∗∗ 2.395∗
∗ 
 2.168∗∗∗ 1.598 1.988∗∗ 
 (0.963) (0.850) (1.006)  (0.781) (1.201) (0.844) 
Treatment 44 31 31  42 29 29 
Observations 2406 1962 1534  2526 2135 2027 
Industry fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Covariate set No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Note: This table presents the OLS and PSM estimates of ATET where the dependent 
variables are CAPM-adjusted or Fama-French (FF) adjusted 10-days CARs from date 1 
to 9. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The covariate set includes profitability 
ratio, leverage ratio, annual sales growth, market cap, 5-year corporate income tax rate, 
foreign sales ratio. Industry-specific fixed effects are based on ICB 1-digit industry 
classification (the Industry Classification Benchmark by FTSE International). 
Significance levels are indicated as ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
 In Figure 3, we display graphically, for both ballot dates, the estimated ATETs from 
OLS regressions based on FFM-adjusted CARs, along with 95 percent confidence 
intervals. Here, we conduct in-time placebo tests around the event dates, which provide 
further insights to the stock market movements around the ballot dates. In these graphs, 
the horizontal axis measures the relative distance in time to the event date, in terms of 
trading days. For each date τ, we repeat our estimations by using 10-day CARs, 
calculated as the sum of ARs from date τ to τ +9. Hence, the ATETs on date 1 correspond 
to those presented in Table 3. As the events of interest are the announcement of the ballot 
results, we assume no informational leakage in the pre-event window. So, in the absence 
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of other events of relevance, we expect the ATETs prior to the event dates to be generally 
insignificant, which serves as placebo test for our model’s performance. Note, however, 
that the placebo ATETs can gradually move towards the event effect in the pre-event 
window, as the 10-days CARs that are closer to the event date pick more ARs from the 
post-event window. In Figure 3, the ATETs in the placebo windows are stable and 
virtually always insignificant. Hence, Figure 3 confirms the ability of our model in 
predicting the normal market performance and establishing a balanced control group. In 
line with Table 3, the ATETs are significant in date 1. ATETs, actually, remain significant 
up to date 4, indicating that while the market reactions started immediately, the 
adjustment process did take a few days to complete. Eventually, the market consumes all 
arbitrage opportunities, and the ATETs become insignificant again after date 4. 
Figure 3: ATETs over the event window with FFM-adjusted CARs 
 
Note: This figure presents the average effects of ballot results for I-732 and I-1631 on 
Washington- based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is 
denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event window are used as 
placebo-event days. The estimation window is given by the 60-day period prior to the 
pseudo window. The 95 percent confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are 
denoted by the capped vertical lines. 
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 The estimation results in Figure 3 show that the effect of I-1631 tends to be much 
larger than that of I-732. Observing some difference between I-732 and I-1631 is in line 
with the initiatives’ different designs. Since I-732 was designed as revenue neutral, and 
its revenues would have been used, mainly, to reduce sales taxes, such a design could 
have partially alleviated the burden of a carbon tax. On the other hand, I-1631 was not 
designed as a revenue-neutral reform. Most revenues would have been earmarked for 
environmental purposes, benefitting a relatively small group of firms active in the green 
economy but leading to higher net costs for virtually all other firms. These results seem to 
indicate that investors may pay attention to the design of policies in evaluating their 
effects on firms’ profitability. We provide further evidence on this aspect in the following 
section.8 
 Both Table 3 and Figure 3 show substantial reactions to the rejection of the carbon 
tax initiatives. On average over the entire sample, the estimated effect is as high as 3 
percent. It follows that the stock market had already priced in, at least to some extent, the 
possibility of a positive outcome in both 2016 and 2018. Consequently, the realization of 
an uncertain outcome required a market adjustment, which in this case affected the 
performance of Washington-based firms positively. Given our conservative approach and 
the limited jurisdiction and ambition of the policy proposals that we investigate, our first 
set of results already point to a potential for large readjustments in the stock market value 
of a broad range of firms in the case of a more abrupt increase in carbon prices. To fully 
gauge the extent that the market reacted to our events, and assess the potential for 
systemic risk, we analyze in the following section heterogeneous treatment effects along 
                                                        
8 In both this section and the following, we use the Hausman (1978) specification test with robust variance-covariance 
matrices to test the difference in estimates between I-1631 and I-732. While we determine that these differences are not 
sufficiently large to reach statistical significance with the full sample, they are statistically significant and economically 
very meaningful for high carbon-intensity firms (see Figure 6). This is consistent with the main finding in the next 
section, which is that average treatment effects for both initiatives are mainly driven by high carbon-intensity firms. 
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the carbon intensity dimension. 
 Note that our empirical approach is robust to a set of sensitivity tests, which are 
presented in the Appendix. In particular, in Appendix B we conduct our analysis by using 
CARs from the market model and the CAPM. Next, we present the results from various 
alternative estimators, such as doubly robust regressions (DRR), in Appendix C. In the 
same Appendix section, we also describe in detail the results from PSM estimations. For 
both DRR and PSM, we also show that the propensity scores and the individual 
covariates are balanced across treatment levels. Further, in Appendix D, we conduct in-
space placebo tests by assuming false treatment groups. Specifically, we assume in turn 
that a state other than Washington is treated and estimate in-space placebo ATETs. These 
in-space placebo tests rely on non-parametric permutation tests, which do not require 
imposing any distributional assumption on the error term (MacKinnon and Webb 2019). 
In the same way, we also realize placebo tests by randomly assigning the treatment 
among all firms in the Russell 3000 index, regardless of their location. Results from this 
exercise are also presented in Appendix D. In this Appendix section, we show that our 
results are robust also to non-parametric inference. Such an approach is used in the 
literature also to pacify concerns about generated dependent variables, small-sample 
issues, cross-sectional correlation due to clustered assignment, and the absence of random 
assignment. In the following sections, we provide further insights into our results by 
analyzing heterogeneity along the carbon intensity dimension and by examining stock 
market reactions to the announcement of both initiatives. 
Heterogeneity in stock market reactions 
 In this section, we investigate heterogeneity around the event effects. An obvious 
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dimension on which to analyze stock market adjustments following the rejection of a 
carbon tax is carbon intensity. We follow the standard split-sample approach, so that we 
repeat our estimations by splitting the treatment and control groups into two sub-samples 
at the median carbon intensity of the treatment group. 
 The results for I-732 are illustrated in Figure 4. Here, we calculate the carbon 
intensity of firms by normalizing the carbon emissions variable with net sales. The 
emissions-to-sales ratio is particularly interesting for I-732, as this policy would have 
redistributed carbon-tax revenues by reducing the sales tax. In line with economic 
intuition, Figure 4 suggests that the effect of I-732’s rejection, as detailed above, is 
mainly driven by the adjustments on the stock value of high-intensity firms. 
Figure 4: Heterogeneity in the ATETs of I-732 over the event window along the 
carbon intensity dimension with FFM-adjusted CARs 
 
Note: This figure presents the average effect of ballot result for I-732 on above and below 
median carbon intensity firms in Washington state, together with in-time placebo tests. 
The event day (date 0) is denoted by the dashed vertical line. The days prior to the event 
window are used as placebo- event days. The estimation window is given by the 60-day 
period prior to the pseudo window. The 95 percent confidence intervals, based on robust 
standard errors, are denoted by the capped vertical lines. 
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The effect of I-732 on high-intensity firms is considerably larger than that on low-
intensity firms. We now turn to I-1631. For this initiative, we investigate heterogeneity by 
normalizing emissions with the value of tangible assets such as plants, properties, and 
equipment. The results, presented in Figure 5, are consistent with Figure 4. Indeed, 
Figure 5 shows that, also for I-1631’s rejection, the stock market adjustments are mainly 
driven by high-intensity firms.9 
Figure 5: Heterogeneity in the ATETs of I-1631 over the event window with FFM- 
adjusted CARs 
 
Note: This figure presents the average effect of ballot result for I-1631 on above and 
below median carbon intensity firms in Washington state, together with in-time placebo 
tests. The event day (date 0) is denoted by the dashed vertical line. The days prior to the 
event window are used as placebo- event days. The estimation window is given by the 
60-day period prior to the pseudo window. The 95 percent confidence intervals, based on 
robust standard errors, are denoted by the capped vertical lines. 
 The results in Figure 5 show that the estimated average effect of I-1631 in the high 
carbon intensity sample tends to be as high as 5 percent. This estimate needs to be put 
                                                        
9 Our findings are robust to alternative specifications of the carbon intensity ratio. Using sales as denominator leads to 
only slightly lower (higher) estimates for high-intensity (low-intensity) firms for I-1631. Using physical capital as 
denominator leads to a somewhat smaller difference between high- and low-intensity firms for I-732. 
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into perspective. First, it refers to an average over 50 percent of the universe of 
Washington-based firms, namely what we define as carbon-intensive firms. Second, it is 
the result of a very conservative approach, in the way the treatment is attributed. Third, it 
follows from the rejection of a proposal for which the odds of a defeat were not at 0 
percent, despite the overall surprise with respect to the opinion polls. Fourth, both I-732 
and I-1631 are policies with moderate ambition and limited jurisdiction. In this light, our 
results, which already suggest substantial readjustments in the value of 50 percent of the 
traded stocks, need to be interpreted as a lower bound for a potential national policy, or a 
regional policy with higher ambition. 
Figure 6: Differences between the ATETs of I-732 and I-1631 over the event window 
for high carbon intensity firms with FFM-adjusted CARs 
 
Note: This figure presents the differences between the average effects of ballot results for 
I-732 and I-1631 on Washington-based firms with above median carbon intensity. The 
event day (date 0) is denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event 
window are used as placebo-event days. The estimation window is given by the 60-day 
period prior to the pseudo window. The 90 percent confidence intervals, based on robust 
standard errors, are denoted by the capped vertical lines. 
 Revenue neutrality, however, may mitigate, if partially, the potential for systemic 
risk. In Figure 5, the estimated effects for high-intensity firms are considerably larger 
compared to I-732. We provide statistical tests on these differences in Figure 6, where we 
test the null of zero difference between the ATETs of each initiative, by using the 
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standard specification test by Hausman (1978) with robust variance-covariance matrices. 
The results show that the estimated effect of I-1631 on high-intensity firms is 
significantly higher than that of I-732. These results are consistent with the different 
designs between the two carbon tax initiatives. 
Stock market reactions on the path to the ballots 
 The positive stock market reactions that we observe following the rejection of both 
initiatives on the respective ballot days and shortly after both suggest that investors had 
already priced in, if only partially, the potential implications of a successful vote. In order 
to validate this intuition, we further investigate the reactions to the announcements of 
both initiatives. With respect to ballot days, announcements have one advantage. Since 
ballots take place on the same day of major elections, the presence of noise may make 
precise estimation of the ATETs harder to achieve. Such issue may not be present for 
announcements. However, with respect to ballot days, announcements also have 
disadvantages. Information about the plans to launch a new initiative may already 
circulate before its formal announcement. Hence, the adjustments that one may observe 
following a formal announcement may mainly capture the effect of investors readjusting 
their beliefs and upgrading carbon tax proposals from rumors to actual initiatives with 
potential to become policy. Further, announcements represent only the first of several 
steps before an initiative reaches the ballot box. 
 We start with the early days of I-732. On March 11, 2015, stand-up economist Yoram 
Bauman formally submitted the initiative to Washington’s Secretary of State. The results 
for this date are presented in Figure 7. First, the estimated ATETs are negative for high-
intensity firms and positive for low-intensity firms. The size of these reactions is 
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comparable in absolute terms. As a result, the average reaction is close to zero. This 
pattern is similar, albeit not entirely symmetric, to what observed in Figure 4 for the 
ballot day. Note that the information set available to investors is different across the two 
dates. First, media coverage was relatively limited around the submission date. Second, 
the arguments of the opposition campaign may be absent, or less salient, at the time of the 
announcement. Hence, at the time of the announcement, investors might have rewarded 
low-intensity firms. Recall that I-732 was designed on the model of British Columbia’s 
carbon tax. Empirical evidence has been circulating for some time suggesting that the 
British Columbia revenue-neutral carbon tax might have led to employment losses in 
energy-intensive firms, but employment gains in clean firms, especially small firms 
active in the local service sector (Azevedo et al. 2017; Yamazaki 2017). These findings 
have been considered evidence in favor of the “job-shifting hypothesis” of revenue-
neutral carbon taxes, with which the evidence in Figure 7 is consistent. In this light, the 
more subdued effects on the ballot day may reflect a more conservative approach by 
investors, whose beliefs might have been influenced, over the course of about two years, 








Figure 7: ATETs over the event window for submission of I-732 with FFM-adjusted 
CARs 
 
Note: This figure presents the average effect of I-732’s submission on all Washington-
based firms, as well as above and below median carbon intensity firms in Washington, 
together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is indicated with the dashed 
line. The days prior to the event window are the placebo-event days. The estimation 
window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The 95 percent confidence 
intervals, based on robust standard errors, are indicated with capped-vertical lines. 
 
 We now turn to the early days of I-1631. As before, we start with the formal 
announcement, which took place on March 2, 2018. However, this announcement took 
place, intentionally, on the same date that Senate Bill 6203 (SB-6203), a carbon tax 
proposal championed by Governor Jay Inslee, failed to gather sufficient support among 
state legislators. The design of SB-6203 and I-1631 are similar, and these two 
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overlapping events are linked. Immediately after the rejection of SB-6203, proponents of 
a carbon tax with earmarked revenues switched to the initiative toolbox to promote their 
policy design. 
 Figure 8 presents the estimation results for this date. The estimated reactions are 
very similar to those observed in Figure 5 following the rejection of I-1631: a positive 
market reaction driven mainly by high carbon-intensity firms. Hence, we may assume 
that the rejection of SB-6203, a carbon tax proposal that could have immediately become 
policy, dominated the effect of I-1631’s announcement. 
Figure 8: ATETs over the event window for submission of I-1631 (and rejection of 
SB 6203) with FFM-adjusted CARs 
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Note: This figure presents the average effect of SB-6203’s rejection on all Washington-
based firms, as well as above and below median carbon intensity firms in Washington, 
together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is indicated with the dashed 
line. The days prior to the event window are the placebo-event days. The estimation 
window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The 95 percent confidence 
intervals, based on robust standard errors, are indicated with capped-vertical lines. 
Figure 9: ATETs over the event window for the clearance for circulation of I-1631 
with FFM-adjusted CARs 
 
Note: This figure presents the average effect of I-1631’s clearance for circulation on all 
Washington- based firms, as well as above and below median carbon intensity firms in 
the state, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is denoted by the 
dashed vertical line. The days prior to the event window are used as placebo-event days. 
The estimation window is given by the 60-day period prior to the pseudo window. The 95 





 About two weeks after the submission date, on March 20, 2018, I-1631 was cleared 
for circulation by the state’s Secretary of State. Figure 9 illustrates the results for the 
clearance date. Figure 9 shows that when I-1631 received formal clearance, the stock 
market reacted negatively, on average. Again, this reaction was driven mainly by high- 
intensity stocks. Note that, given the short time window between formal submission and 
formal clearance, the significant ATETs in the pre-event window are related to the rejection 
of SB-6203. The pattern that we observe for the date of clearance mirrors the effects found 
for the ballot date, when I-1631 was ultimately rejected. The fact that the market reacted 
when I-1631 received clearance also supports the idea that before the ballot date the market 
had partly priced in a potential success on the ballot. 
Conclusions 
 
 About 20 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are subject to carbon pricing. 
Many jurisdictions are considering implementing a carbon price while others are 
constantly increasing the stringency of their carbon pricing schemes. Following the Paris 
Agreement, a first acceleration in the implementation of carbon pricing schemes has been 
observed. A further acceleration may follow over the next few years, as countries are 
expected to ratchet up their climate goals, or Nationally Determined Contributions. 
Slowly but steadily, the world is moving forward towards a state in which coverage of 
greenhouse gas emissions by carbon pricing is much higher. Consistently, economists are 
increasingly vocal about the prospects of harmonizing carbon prices with the ultimate 
goal of achieving a global carbon price (Weitzman 2014; Stiglitz et al. 2017; Carattini et 
al. 2019). 
 A sudden convergence towards relatively high carbon prices, while justified from a 
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climate perspective, may pose a threat to the stability of the financial system. As a result, 
central bankers have expressed deep concerns about the risk of financial contagion, 
driven by climate policy. Carbon pricing could lead investors to reevaluate a broad range 
of assets, of which many could become “stranded.” Given the considerable exposure of 
financial actors to carbon-intensive firms, beyond fossil fuel industries, and the strong 
interlinkages among such actors, there is high potential for a systemic risk. While central 
banks and other institutions in charge of financial stability have been investing important 
resources to refine their models of systemic risk and consider climate stress tests in their 
portfolio of macroprudential strategies, there is a need for empirical analyses, measuring 
whether and by how much investors reevaluate the value of stocks following a change in 
the probability of carbon pricing being implemented. 
 In this paper, we analyze the unique case of Washington state, where two carbon tax 
proposals were brought, two years apart, to the ballot box by two bottom-up initiatives. 
Furthermore, we leverage the different designs of these carbon tax proposals. I-732, 
rejected on the ballot in 2016, was designed as revenue neutral, with carbon tax revenues 
being compensated by lower sales taxes. I-1631, rejected in 2018, would have expanded 
the government’s budget. In particular, the carbon tax revenues would have been 
earmarked for environmental and social purposes. 
 We analyze the stock performance of Washington-based firms against their 
counterfactual scenarios and find important swings in the value of Washington-based 
firms following investors’ reassessment of the risks of a carbon price being implemented 
in the state. We identify significant reactions for both initiatives, suggesting that, if 
accepted, they would have led to a significant loss of market value for Washington-based 
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firms. Consistent with its revenue-neutral design, we observe relatively smaller effects 
for I-732. Further, in both cases we observe important heterogeneity along the carbon-
intensity dimension. 
 Hence, our findings support central banks’ calls for macroprudential policies to 
anticipate the implementation of carbon pricing, which remains the most cost-effective 
policy even in the presence of stranded assets. While our results do not provide a direct 
test for the effectiveness of such macroprudential policies, they suggest that even a 
moderate carbon tax, with limited jurisdiction, can lead to important readjustments to the 
stock market, especially for carbon-intensive firms. Hence, the implementation of carbon 
pricing at the scale required to deal effectively with climate change, and potential global 
coordination on carbon taxes, could lead to important shocks to the financial sectors, if 
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A. Other Washington state initiatives on the ballot 
 In this section, we discuss other state initiatives that were on the ballot together with 
I-732 and I-1631. In 2016, Washington state voters were asked to vote on the following 
additional initiatives: Initiative 735 (I-735), Initiative 1433 (I-1433), and Initiative 735 (I-
735). I-735 aimed at regulating political contributions, urging the Washington state 
congressional delegation to propose a federal constitutional amendment that reserves 
constitutional rights for people and not corporations, in response to Citizens’ United. In 
the last month before the vote, opinion polls had 48 percent of the electorate in favor and 
18 percent against. With no surprise, I-735 was accepted at 63 percent. I-1433 aimed at 
incrementally raising the state’s minimum wage from $9.47 to $13.50 by 2020 and 
mandating employers to offer paid sick leave. In the last month before the vote, opinion 
polls had 57-62 percent of the electorate in favor and 27-31 percent against. With no 
surprise, I-1433 was accepted at 57 percent. I-1464 aimed at revising campaign finance 
laws and implement “democracy credits” with which residents could have redirected state 
funds towards qualifying candidates. In the last month before the vote, opinion polls had 
the largest share of voters as undecided. I-1464 was rejected at 54 percent. 
 In 2018, Washington state voters were asked to vote on the following additional 
initiatives: Initiative 940 (I-940), Initiative 1634 (I-1634), and Initiative 1639 (I-1639). I-
940 aimed at limiting the use of deadly force by police. The most recent opinion polls 
had 68-69 percent of the electorate in favor and 21-18 percent against. With no surprise, 
I-1940 was accepted at 60 percent. I-1634 aimed at prohibiting local governments from 
enacting taxes on groceries. I-1634 was accepted at 56 percent. I-1639 aimed at 
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restricting the purchase and ownership of firearms. In the last month before the vote, 
opinion polls had 59 percent of the electorate in favor and 34 percent against. With no 
surprise, I-1639 was accepted at 59 percent. 
 Both in 2016 and 2018, there were also advisory votes on the ballot. Advisory votes 
allow voters to share with legislators a preference about policies that are already enacted. 
Advisory votes are non-binding. In 2016, Advisory Vote 15 (AV-15) was on the ballot. It 
was aimed at repealing House Bill 2778 (HB 2778), which itself aimed to limit sales tax 
exemptions to alternative fuel vehicles. Such tax exemptions started in July 2016 and 
were supposed to run for three years or until one month after the state would have 
reached the goal of 7,500 electric vehicles sold. The proposal was approved at 60 percent, 
suggesting legislators repeal HB 2778. In 2018, Advisory Vote 19 (AV19) was also on the 
ballot. It was aimed at maintaining Senate Bill 6269 (SB 6269), which itself aimed to 
expand the oil response and administration taxes to include pipelines. SB-6269 was 
designed as an overall tax of 6 cents per barrel of oil transported via pipelines, estimated 
to yield on average around $1.3 million of annual revenues over 10 years. The effect of 
the price of oil, let alone the price of gas, would have been in the order of cents of cents. 
The total revenues collected by SB 6269 would have been a fraction of what was spent to 
promote and oppose I-1631, which, recall, was in the order of about $50 million dollars. 
The proposal was rejected at 54 percent, suggesting legislators repeal SB 6269. 
 As mentioned above, we are not concerned about these other initiatives acting as 
confounders for the following three reasons. First, some of them are largely irrelevant for 
the stock market, as only a small fraction of the economy is affected by either approval or 
rejection. Second, by the ballot date the outcome of most of them was clearly predictable, 
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with polls suggesting a clear outcome and the ballot results matching the polls’ forecast 
very well. Third, none of the initiatives on the ballot relate directly with the carbon 
intensity of firms in the way that initiatives I-732 and I-1631 do. If the ATETs that we 
find in the main analyses were driven only by these confounders, then we should not find 
any heterogeneity along the carbon-intensity dimension. 
Table A.1: Average event effects on Washington-based firms using the market model 
 Initiative 732 Initiative 1631 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
OLS 0.076 0.731 0.175  2.012∗∗ 2.326∗∗ 2.072∗ 
 (0.974) (0.995) (0.910)  (0.811) (1.112) (1.061) 
Treatment 41 32 32  42 29 29 
Observations 2511 1959 1959  2658 2134 2134 
PSM 1.945∗∗ 3.294∗∗∗ 2.395∗∗  2.168∗∗∗ 1.598 1.988∗∗ 
 (0.963) (0.850) (1.006)  (0.781) (1.201) (0.844) 
Treatment 44 31 31  42 29 29 
Observations 2406 1962 1534  2526 2135 2027 
Industry fixed effects Yes No Yes  Yes No Yes 
Covariate set No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Note: This table presents the OLS and PSM estimates for the ATETs where the dependent 
variables are 10-days CARs from date 1 to 9 based on market model estimations. Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis. The covariate set includes profitability ratio, leverage 
ratio, annual sales growth, market cap, 5-year corporate income tax rate, foreign sales 
ratio. Industry-specific fixed effects are based on ICB (the Industry Classification 
Benchmark by FTSE International) 1-digit industry classification. Significance levels are 
indicated as ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
B. Results with CAPM-adjusted CARs 
 In this section, we illustrate the robustness of our main results to using CARs based 
on the market model and the CAPM. Recall that our main results, presented in the main 
body of text, rely on FFM-adjusted CARs. The results from using the market model are 
presented in Table A.1. The estimated effects for I-732 are small and insignificant, while 
those for I-1631 are around 2 percent and statistically significant. Both in terms of size 
and significance, the results are close to the estimation results based on the CAPM 
presented in Table 3 in the main text. The results from the market model and the CAPM 
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based estimations over time are also similar. In the rest of the section, we then only 
present CAPM based estimations. 
Figure A.1: ATETs over the event window with CAPM-adjusted CARs 
 
Note: This figure presents the average effects of ballot results for I-732 and I-1631 on 
Washington- based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is 
denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event window are the placebo-
event days. The estimation window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The 
95 percent confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are indicated with 
capped vertical lines. 
 In Figure A.1, we present placebo and ATETs tests by using CAPM-adjusted CARs. 
The estimated pattern for I-1631 is very similar to that obtained with FFM-based 
estimations (see Figure 3 in the main body of text). For I-732, the ATET on the first date 
is insignificant and small, which corresponds to the results presented in Table 3. 
However, over the entire time window the estimated pattern for I-732 with CAPM-
adjusted CARs also indicates a positive and gradual stock market reaction, which implies 
full consistency between CAPM- and FFM-adjusted CARs. The gradual adjustment 
pattern observed in this context is consistent with a relatively large amount of 
information to be digested after a major election. 
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Figure A.2: Differences in the ATETs of I-732 and I-1631 over the event window 
with CAPM-adjusted CARs 
 
Note: This figure presents the differences between the average effects of the ballot results 
for I-732 and I-1631 on Washington-based firms with above median carbon intensity. The 
event day (date 0) is denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event 
window are used as placebo-event days. The estimation window is given by the 60-day 
period prior to the pseudo window. The 90 percent confidence intervals, based on robust 
standard errors, are denoted by the capped vertical lines. 
In Figure A.1, the differences between the estimated effects of I-732 and I-1631 are, if 
anything, larger than those implied by the FFM-based estimations. They also turn out to be 
statistically significant over dates 2 and 3, as shown in Figure A.2. 
C. Balance of covariates and sensitivity to estimation methods 
 In this section, we present various diagnostic tests on the ability of our estimators to 
establish a balanced control group as well as estimation results from alternative estimation 
methods for treatments effects, such as PSM and other approaches from the standard 
toolkit. Both OLS and PSM rely on the conditional independence assumption for the 
identification of treatment effects (Angrist and Pischke 2009). In this section, we first start 
by relaxing the functional form specification imposed by OLS. We implement a regression-
based approach known as doubly robust regression (DRR). In short, DRR is based on 
estimating an outcome model with OLS and correcting it for its potential misspecification 
with inverse-probability weights, which are obtained by estimating a treatment model. 
DRR estimates are unbiased even if one of the two models is misspecified. The rationale 
for using DRR is twofold. 
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Table A.2: Overall and covariate balance with DRR by using FFM-adjusted CARs 
 I-732  I-1631 
Covariates / Sample Full Matched  Full Matched 
Leverage ratio -0.400 0.001  -0.335 0.001 
Sales to assets -0.152 -0.002  0.007 0.003 
Annual revenue growth 0.253 0.004  -0.062 0.000 
Log of market cap -0.098 0.004  -0.130 0.003 
Corporate income tax rate 0.086 0.122  0.362 0.325 
Foreign sales ratio -0.364 -0.001  -0.145 -0.002 
Tests on overall balance (χ2)  5.159   3.248 
Note: This table presents standardized differences in the means of covariates between the 
control and treatment groups in the full and matched samples. The last raw provides the 
χ2 statistic to test the null hypothesis that the covariates are balanced across the treatment 
and control groups. 
First, it provides an additional sensitivity check. Second, it allows us to test balancedness 
across treatment levels following a formal test introduced by Imai and Ratkovic (2014). 
In what follows, we start with DRR and then complete our series of robustness tests 
relying on PSM. 
 Table A.2 presents the standardized differences in the means of covariates and the 
test statistics for overall balance following our DRR approach applied to the ballot 
events. Even in the full sample without matching, the standardized differences are close 
to zero for half of our covariates for I-732 and all of our covariates for I-1631. In the 
matched sample, standardized differences are very close to zero for all the covariates. 
Most importantly, for all specifications we cannot reject the null that the covariates are 
balanced across the treatment and control groups. The χ2 test statistics, provided in the 








Figure A.3: DRR estimations for ATETs over the event window with FFM-adjusted 
CARs 
 
Note: This figure presents the average effects of the ballot results for I-732 and I-1631 on 
Washington-based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is 
denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event window are the placebo-
event days. The estimation window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The 
95 percent confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are indicated with 
capped vertical lines. 
 Following this first sanity check, we use DDR as an alternative specification to test 
the robustness of our main results. The main estimates from DDR are presented 
graphically in Figure A.3. The estimates are virtually the same as those obtained with 
OLS and presented in Figures 3. 




 Full Matched  Full Matched 
Leverage ratio -0.400 -0.020  -0.335 0.066 
Sales to assets -0.152 0.039  0.007 0.058 
Annual revenue growth 0.253 -0.084  -0.062 -0.104 
Log of market cap -0.098 0.040  -0.130 0.033 
Corporate income tax rate 0.086 0.275  0.362 0.325 
Foreign sales ratio -0.364 -0.130  -0.145 -0.074 
Note: This table presents standardized differences in the means of covariates between the 
control and treatment groups in the full and matched samples. 
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 We now turn to the estimates from PSM. Following the same approach used with 
DDR, we first look at balancing between treatment and control groups and present the 
standardized differences in the means of covariates. Table A.3 presents the standardized 
differences in the means of covariates following our PSM estimations. The results closely 
resemble our previous results from DRRs. 
 Following our examination of the balancedness between control and treatment 
groups, we display the distribution of propensity scores in Figure A.4 for I-732 and in 
Figure A.5 for I-1631. In the full sample, the mass of the estimated densities is in the 
same region, indicating “common support.” Furthermore, in either case, there is no 
probability mass near 1. Given these two observations, there is no evidence that the strict 
overlap assumption, which is required for estimating ATETs, is violated. As a result, the 
matching procedure balances the propensity scores successfully, as shown in the right 
panels of both Figures A.4 and A.5. 
Figure A.4: Balance of propensity scores for I-732 with FFM-adjusted CARs 
 
Note: This figure compares the distribution of propensity scores for I-731 across the 
treatment and control groups by using the full and matched samples. 
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Figure A.5: Balance of propensity scores for I-1631 with FFM-adjusted CARs 
 
Note: This figure compares the distribution of propensity scores for I-1631 across the 
treatment and control groups by using the full and matched samples. 
 
Figure A.6: PSM estimations for ATETs over the event window with FFM-adjusted 
CARs: Ballot results 
 
Note: This figure presents PSM estimations for the average effects of the ballot results for 
I-732 and I-1631 on Washington-based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The 
event day (date 0) is denoted by the vertical dashed line. The event day (date 0) is 
indicated with the dashed line. The days prior to the event window are the placebo-event 
days. The estimation window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The 95 
percent confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are indicated with capped 
vertical lines. 
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D. Nonparametric inference and in-space placebo tests 
 In this section, we relax all distributional assumptions and apply a non-parametric 
inference strategy to test the robustness of our methodological approach. Our non- 
parametric inference strategy relies on permutation methods. These tests are applied on 
the distribution of a test statistic, which is obtained through the random permutation of 
the treatment vector (Imbens and Rubin 2015). In our context, each permutation 
randomly assigns firms from the full Russell 3000 sample to either treatment or control 
groups, while preserving the original size of both groups. 
 We realize 1,000 random permutation of the treatment vector and present the results 
in Figure A.7. The capped lines indicate the median, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile of 
the distribution obtained with the random permutation. For inference purposes, we 
compute a p-value based on the rank of the estimated ATET in this empirical distribution. 
This p-value gives the probability of estimating, by pure chance, an estimate at least as 
large as our estimates for I-732 and I-1631. The results of this non-parametric exercise, 
presented in Figure A.7, show that this probability is below 5 percent. These results are 
robust to additional checks, such as combining randomization with stratification along 
the industry dimension. This additional check ensures that our results are robust also to 
random assignment of industries into the treatment group. That is, it confirms that the 
results are not driven by potential selection of industry clusters into treatment. 
 We now turn to another inference strategy suggested by MacKinnon and Webb 
(2019), in which we compare the estimated ATETs for I-732 and I-1631 against a 
distribution of placebo ATETs estimated from assigning the treatment to the states in the 
control group. This approach accounts for potential cross-sectional correlation due to 
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treatment assignment in clusters. 
 In our analysis, we exclude small states with fewer than 10 firms and focus on the 
remaining 33 states. Figure A.8 presents the results from these in-space placebo tests. 
Similarly to Figure A.7, the capped lines indicate the median, 10th percentile, and 90th 
percentile of the distribution of placebo ATETs obtained at each date. Figure A.8 shows 
that the estimated effects for I-732 and I-1631 are larger than 90 percent of the placebo 
ATETs. Note that, in the same spirit of all other analyses, we take a conservative approach 
and include in the distribution the estimated ATETs for Washington State (see MacKinnon 
and Webb 2019). We interpret these results akin to the non-parametric p-values from 
randomization inference techniques. That is, the probability of observing an estimate at 
least as large as our estimates for I-732 and I-1631 is at most 10 percent. 
Figure A.7: ATETs over the event window based on FFM-adjusted CARs and 
randomization inference 
 
Note: This figure presents the average effects of the ballot results for I-732 and I-1631 on 
Washington-based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is 
denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event window are the placebo-
event days. The estimation window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The 
vertical capped lines show the median, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile of permutation 
tests. 
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Figure A.8: ATETs over the event window based on FFM-adjusted CARs and 
inference based on in-space placebo tests 
 
Note: This figure presents the average effects of the ballot results for I-732 and I-1631 on 
Washington-based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is 
denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event window are the placebo-
event days. The estimation window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The 
capped lines show the median, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile of in-space placebo 
ATETs from assigning the treatment to each state in the US. 
